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Abstract
This paper analyzes the loss allocation to first, second, and third loss positions in European
collateralized debt obligation transactions. The quality of the underlying asset pool plays a
predominant role for the loss allocation. A lower asset pool quality induces the originator
to take a higher first loss position, but, in a synthetic transaction, a smaller third loss
position. The share of expected default losses, borne by the first loss position, is largely
independent of asset pool quality but lower in securitizations of corporate loans than in
those of corporate bonds. Originators with a good rating and low Tobin’s Q prefer synthetic
transactions.
I. Introduction
The global annual issuance volume of securitizations has grown from roughly
270 bn USD in 1997 to about 2100 bn USD in 2006 (Herrmann, Sun, Jha,
Rudolph, Beckmann, and Bishko (2007)). The recent financial crisis depressed it.
Securitizations, in particular those of mortgage-backed loans, are viewed as one
driver of this crisis (The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report (2011)).
Yet, there are now many attempts to revive securitization because, in principle,
it allows a better allocation of default risks across banks and nonbanks. A major
impediment to the transfer of default risks is information asymmetries between
the seller and the buyer of debt claims. In a securitization transaction, credit en-
hancements such as first loss positions (FLPs) serve to protect the buyers of rated
tranches against adverse selection and moral hazard of the originator. Improved
alignment of incentives of originators and buyers is a crucial ingredient for fi-
nancial stability (International Monetary Fund (2011), ch. III). In a securitization
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1126 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
transaction this alignment is closely related to the allocation of default risks to
FLPs, to rated securitization tranches (second loss positions (SLPs)), and, in case
of synthetic transactions, to the nonsecuritized super-senior third loss positions
(TLPs).
This paper investigates the determinants of FLPs in securitization transac-
tions. Conventional wisdom suggests that the originator should retain the FLP
because it is the most information-sensitive tranche and sell the information-
insensitive senior tranches (Boot and Thakor (1993)). Yet, we observe many
synthetic transactions in which the super-senior tranche is not securitized. We
also address this puzzle to find out what drives the originator’s choice between
true sale and synthetic transactions. Understanding loss allocation is crucial for
the risk management of originators of securitization transactions and for asset
allocation of investors buying rated tranches, but also for regulators trying to
make banks less vulnerable to default risks embedded in securitizations. More-
over, studying loss allocation provides new insights into the mechanisms used in
modern structured finance to deal with market imperfections.
We study the loss allocation in a subset of European securitization trans-
actions, called collateralized debt obligation (CDO) transactions. In collateral-
ized loan obligation (CLO) transactions, also called balance sheet transactions, a
bank securitizes part of its corporate loan portfolio. In collateralized bond obli-
gation (CBO) transactions, also called arbitrage transactions, the originator of
the transaction, a bank or an investment manager, buys corporate bonds, pools
them in a portfolio, and securitizes it. Our data set does not include CDOs of
mortgage-backed loans or bonds,1 which were at the center of the recent financial
crisis. Corporate loans and bonds underlying CLOs and CBOs turned out to be
rather stable, as we argue later. Therefore, our findings should remain valid for
the design of future securitization transactions.
Loss allocation in securitization transactions would be irrelevant in a perfect
capital market. In imperfect markets, loss allocation is driven by balancing the
interests of originators and investors, subject to various market imperfections such
as regulation, information asymmetries, funding cost differentials, and transaction
costs. We attempt to find out how these drivers and the quality of the securitized
asset pool affect loss allocation. The analysis is refined by comparing different
types of transactions, such as true sale versus synthetic transactions and CLO
versus CBO transactions.
First, we restate some basics about securitizations. The 3 players governing
securitization are banks and investment managers as originators of these transac-
tions, investors buying securitization tranches, and the rating agencies as infor-
mation intermediaries. Given the models of the rating agencies, originators and
investors determine the loss allocation in securitization transactions. The origina-
tor selects a set of loans and/or bonds2 as the underlying asset pool of the transac-
tion. In all transactions, loss allocation is governed by strict subordination. Default
losses are solely borne by the FLP, also called equity tranche, until this tranche is
1This does not rule out that a corporate loan or bond is also partly collateralized by a mortgage or
other types of collateral.
2The bonds may include a few tranches of other securitizations or structured finance products.
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Franke, Herrmann, and Weber 1127
completely absorbed by these losses. Then, the next losses are solely borne by the
tranche with the lowest rating until it is fully absorbed, and so on. Strict subordina-
tion generates very strong quality differences between the tranches. In a true sale
transaction, the originator sells all loans/bonds without recourse to the special
purpose vehicle, which issues the equity tranche and various rated bond tranches,
usually including a large Aaa tranche. The par values of all tranches add up to the
par value of all loans/bonds securitized or slightly less. Therefore, the transaction
is fully funded. The originator can freely use the proceeds from tranche issuance.
In a synthetic transaction the originator retains ownership of the loans/bonds and
transfers part of the default risk through a credit default swap to the special pur-
pose vehicle. This swap covers default risks beyond a threshold that defines the
FLP; the coverage is limited by the par value of the issued tranches, which is
usually much smaller than the par value of the underlying asset pool (partially
funded transaction). Investors buying these tranches take an SLP. Default losses
beyond the FLP and SLP are borne by the nonsecuritized super-senior tranche,
a TLP held by the originator. She may insure its risk by buying a senior default
swap. In a synthetic transaction the originator obtains no funding. The issuance
proceeds need to be invested in Aaa securities or other almost default-free assets
in order to provide strong collateral for the investors taking the SLP.
In a CLO transaction the originator usually owns the loans to be securitized,
while in a CBO transaction she buys bonds, pools them, and securitizes the asset
pool. In a CLO transaction the originator acts as the servicer of the loans so that
her monitoring and collection policies affect loan defaults. In a CBO transaction
the originator lacks this role so that her impact on defaults is very limited. The
impact of the originator on the evolution of default losses of the asset pool also
depends on whether the transaction is static or dynamic. In a static deal, the asset
pool is determined from the outset; new assets cannot be added later on. In a
dynamic (managed) deal, the originator may change the asset pool over time,
subject to various restrictions in the securitization contract to preserve the quality
of the asset pool.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to empirically study
the impact of the quality of the asset pool and originator characteristics on the
loss allocation in securitization transactions. To measure the quality of the asset
pool, we rely on the most important quality characteristics published by Moody’s,
the assets’ weighted average default probability (WADP) and Moody’s diversity
score (DS) as well as the more sophisticated adjusted diversity score (ADS). A
lower WADP and/or a higher DS indicate a better asset pool quality. Relying
on Moody’s assessment may be viewed as problematic. Rating agencies, being
important players in the securitization business, have come under strong attack
in the subprime crisis. Their initial ratings of bonds issued in securitizations of
subprime loans strongly underestimated the default risk. A huge wave of down-
grades of these bonds followed in 2007. However, ratings of corporate bonds and
of CDOs like those used in our sample escaped severe criticism. These ratings
were quite stable until the end of 2007.3 This is also supported by the evidence in
3Worldwide, the percentage of Moody’s downgrades over the previous 12 months did not change
significantly from the first to the last quarter of 2007, being around 9.5%, compared to an average of
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109012000336
D
ow
nloaded from
 https:/w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core . U
niversity of B
asel Library , on 11 Jul 2017 at 08:10:29 , subject to the C
am
bridge C
ore term
s of use, available at https:/w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s .
1128 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Newman, Fabozzi, Lucas, and Goodman (2008). Clearly, Moody’s quality assess-
ments are subject to estimation error. We assume that they are unbiased indicators
of default risk.
The new findings of the paper can be summarized as follows:
First, we show that ratings based on the probability of default (PD) imply the
observed strict subordination of securitization tranches.
Second, the empirical evidence strongly confirms an inverse relation between
the quality of the securitized asset pool and the size of the FLP, but a positive rela-
tion between asset pool quality and the size of the TLP in synthetic transactions.
Since information asymmetry is likely to be stronger for asset pools of lower
quality, the inverse relation between the size of the FLP and asset pool quality
suggests that the FLP grows with the perceived extent of information asymme-
try.4 The positive relation between the size of the TLP and asset pool quality
suggests that loss allocation to the TLP is driven primarily by the originator’s risk
and funding strategy.
Third, we ask whether there exists a measure of investor protection against
default losses that is invariant to asset pool quality. Such a measure of loss allo-
cation might balance the interests of the originator and investors. Since the size
of the FLP is a crude measure of protection, we investigate 2 other measures of
investor protection, assuming a lognormal distribution for the default loss rate of
the underlying asset pool. The 1st measure is the share of expected default losses
absorbed by the FLP, called the loss share. The 2nd measure is the probability
that all default losses are exclusively borne by the FLP (i.e., investors are not hit
by default losses). We denote it as the support probability of the FLP.
Empirically, it turns out that the loss share is largely independent of the
asset pool quality, in contrast to the support probability. The loss share is, on
average, about 84% for CLO transactions and about 90% for CBO transactions. In
CLO transactions there is much room for the originator’s moral hazard; in CBO
transactions there is not. Hence, one would expect a higher loss share in CLO
transactions, in contrast to the empirical evidence. This suggests that moral hazard
may lead to high reputation costs for the originator, implying a strong monitoring
effort. Therefore, investors may accept a smaller loss share in CLO transactions.
Fourth, the attractiveness of a synthetic relative to a true sale transaction in-
creases with asset pool quality. Better quality implies a lower default risk of the
super-senior tranche, making it less attractive for the originator to sell this tranche.
A TLP is in stark contrast to the literature, which argues that the originator should
sell the least information-sensitive tranche. The preference for synthetic transac-
tions appears to be stronger for originators with a better rating. This may also
be driven by funding costs. Highly rated originators can obtain cheaper funding
issuing standard bonds rather than highly rated bonds in true sale securitizations.
12.6% over the period 1985 through the 3rd quarter of 2008 (Moody’s (2008)). In the United States
and Canada, there was even a slight decline in downgrades, while in Europe there was some increase.
Not surprisingly, corporate downgrades increased in 2008. Similar results are obtained for Standard
& Poor’s (S&P) as shown by Bloomberg and Fitch (Fitch (2008)).
4Originators rarely announce to what extent they retain the FLP. The current financial market
reforms require the originator to retain at least 5% of all default losses to mitigate adverse selection
and moral hazard.
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Franke, Herrmann, and Weber 1129
Fifth, the last important surprising finding is that characteristics of the origi-
nator such as her total capital ratio or Tobin’s Q, which may proxy for her securi-
tization motives, add little to the explanatory power of the regressions.
The paper is structured as follows: Section II reviews the literature. In Sec-
tion III we model the originator’s choice problem and derive hypotheses. The
empirical findings are presented and discussed in Section IV. Section V concludes.
II. Literature Review
Several papers analyze the optimality of FLPs. In the absence of information
asymmetries, Arrow (1971) (see also Gollier and Schlesinger (1996)) analyzes
the optimal insurance contract for a setting in which the protection buyer is risk
averse but the protection sellers are risk neutral. If they bound their expected loss
from above, then an FLP of the protection buyer is optimal. Townsend (1979)
considers risk sharing between a risk-averse entrepreneur and investors in the
presence of information asymmetries about the entrepreneur’s ability to pay. The
optimal contract is a standard debt contract implying an FLP of the entrepreneur
(see also Gale and Hellwig (1985)). Malamud, Rui, and Whinston (2009) study
optimal tranching in a securitization transaction, given a perfect market where
agents have homogeneous expectations but heterogeneous preferences. In their
model, optimal risk sharing is achieved by issuing multiple tranches and investors
buying different portfolios of tranches.
The literature on security design distinguishes between information-sensitive
and -insensitive securities. Boot and Thakor (1993) argue that a risky cash flow
should be split into a senior and a subordinated security. The senior information-
insensitive security can be sold to uninformed investors, while the information-
sensitive subordinated security should be sold to informed investors. This should
raise the sales revenue. Riddiough (1997) extends this reasoning by showing that
loan bundling allows for asset pool diversification, which softens information
asymmetries.5 DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) analyze the security design assum-
ing a trade-off between the retention cost of holding cash flows and the liquid-
ity cost of selling information-sensitive securities. They prove that a standard
debt contract is optimal. DeMarzo (2005) shows that pooling of assets has an
information-destruction effect, since it prohibits the seller from selling asset cash
flows separately. But pooling improves diversification. Tranching allows selling
more liquid, information-insensitive claims. Summarizing, these papers demon-
strate the optimality of an FLP and argue that the senior information-insensitive
tranches should be sold to investors. This is in strong contrast to synthetic trans-
actions where the large least information-sensitive tranche, the TLP, is not sold.
Duffie and Gaˆrleanu (2001) discuss adverse selection and moral hazard in
securitizations. They also discuss Moody’s DS and illustrate the sensitivity of
the portfolio loss rate distribution to various parameters.6 Duffie, Eckner, Horel,
5Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) consider a bank that optimizes the fraction of a single loan to be
sold and the guarantee against loan default through a repurchase agreement.
6Plantin (2003) shows that sophisticated institutions with high distribution costs buy and sell the
junior tranches, leaving senior tranches to retail institutions with low distribution costs.
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1130 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
and Saita (2009) argue that unobservable, nonstationary risk factors raise default
correlations and imply higher tail risks for loan portfolios. This could explain
the rather high credit spreads on Aaa tranches in securitizations. Albrecher,
Ladoucette, and Schoutens (2007) propose a generic 1-factor Le´vy model to derive
the portfolio loss rate distribution. Burtschell, Gregory, and Laurent (2009) com-
pare models with one latent factor and different copulas to derive default inten-
sities for CDOs. In an empirical study, Krekel (2008) proposes a Gaussian base
correlation model with correlated recovery rates to improve the empirical model
fit. Longstaff and Rajan (2008) estimate loss distributions of Credit Default Index
tranches with multifactor models and find that a 3-factor model leads to a 3-modal
loss rate distribution, where the 2nd (3rd) mode has a much smaller density than
the 1st (2nd). They interpret the 2nd and 3rd factors as default clustering factors.
Among the empirical studies of securitizations, Downing and Wallace (2005)
find in commercial mortgage-backed securities transactions that FLPs are higher
than what might be expected looking at the actual performance of mortgages.
Downing, Jaffee, and Wallace (2009) observe that securitized assets have lower
quality than nonsecuritized. Consistent with this, Piskorski, Seru, and Vig (2010)
find a lower foreclosure rate associated with bank-held loans compared to similar
securitized loans. Purnanandam (2011) observes significantly higher mortgage-
related write-offs for banks that are more engaged in true sale securitizations,
consistent with adverse selection and moral hazard. Loutskina and Strahan (2009)
argue that securitization raises banks’ willingness to approve mortgages that are
hard to sell. Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) document that banks securitizing
loans hold less capital than other banks and have more risky assets relative to
total assets. Franke and Krahnen (2006) find that securitization tends to raise the
bank’s stock market beta, indicating more systematic risk.
III. Hypotheses
A. Strict Subordination
In this section we present the hypotheses to be tested. Since strict subordi-
nation is perhaps the most striking property of loss allocation in securitization
transactions, we first motivate it by the strong role played by the rating agencies.
S&P and Fitch rate according to the PD, while Moody’s rates according to the
expected loss rate. The empirical evidence shows that Moody’s ratings are similar
to PD ratings. The following lemma shows that under weak conditions, PD rating
leads to strict subordination.
Lemma 1. Assume that i) the owner of a tranche enjoys limited liability, ii) the
issuer of securitization tranches minimizes the credit spreads to be paid, iii) the
credit spread paid on a tranche is inversely related to its rating, and iv) inverse
loss sharing is ruled out. Then PD rating implies strict subordination of tranches.
The first 3 assumptions of the lemma need no explanation. Inverse loss shar-
ing is defined by a loss sharing such that at least one agent bears less default losses
when the default loss of the underlying asset pool increases. This agent would
benefit from higher losses of the asset pool and, thus, have an incentive to raise
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Franke, Herrmann, and Weber 1131
losses. So inverse loss sharing is ruled out. Then PD rating implies strict subordi-
nation. The proof is straightforward. Consider a transaction with 2 tranches only.
If both tranches share the 1st unit of default losses as well as additional units, then
both tranches have the same PD. To minimize the PD of the 2nd tranche, holding
the PD of the 1st tranche constant, the latter has to exclusively bear all losses until
it is exhausted. This maximizes the rating of the 2nd tranche and, hence, mini-
mizes the credit spread of this tranche. The same argument applies to multiple
rated tranches, proving the lemma.
B. Information Asymmetry and Asset Pool Quality
The PD-based rating implies a minimum size of the FLP under the usual
condition that the lowest rating of a rated tranche is B or better. While ratings
provide important information to investors, they cannot remove information asym-
metries completely. Originators usually have better information on loans and
bonds underlying a transaction than investors. This creates room for adverse
selection and moral hazard of the originator, so that investors presumably demand
higher credit spreads for rated securitization tranches. The originator may try to
reduce this penalty by credit enhancements, in particular by an FLP. The stronger
the information asymmetry, the higher the FLP should be.
To model information asymmetries, we distinguish between the published
and the true quality of the underlying asset pool. Asset pool quality is measured
by the WADP of the loans/bonds in the asset pool and by asset pool diversification.
Diversification is summarized by Moody’s DS or the improved ADS. This score
can be interpreted as the diversification-equivalent number of equal-sized loans
whose defaults are uncorrelated. A 3rd characteristic of the asset pool quality
is the weighted average expected loss given default. To simplify modeling we
assume that the loss given default λ is nonrandom. Then the expected loss rate of
the asset pool is λWADP. Given λ, we characterize asset pool quality by WADP
and DS or ADS.
We assume that rating agencies publish unbiased information about the
underlying asset pool quality.7 The true quality differs from the published quality
by a noise term ε,
published asset pool quality = true asset pool quality + ε.
The standard deviation of the noise term, σ(ε), is a measure of quality
uncertainty. It should be inversely related to the true asset pool quality. The
intuition for this is that errors in estimating WADP are likely to be proportional
to the true WADP. If the true WADP is very small (high), then errors in estimating
WADP are likely to be small (high). Also, σ(ε) should be inversely related to the
true DS. As pointed out by DeMarzo (2005) and others, a high DS reduces in-
formation asymmetries because the idiosyncratic risks of the assets tend to be
7As argued in the Introduction, the criticism of rating agencies concerns their rating of securitiza-
tions of mortgage-backed loans, not that of corporate loans or bonds. In any case, our sample ends in
2005. At that time, confidence in ratings was still very strong.
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1132 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
diversified away. Hence, asset pool quality and quality uncertainty should be
inversely related.
Quality uncertainty creates room for adverse selection and moral hazard
and therefore should be priced. One might argue that investors can buy tranches
of many different transactions and thereby diversify their ε-risk. But buying a
tranche incurs management and other transaction costs constraining diversifica-
tion.8 Moreover, there is a nondiversifiable risk that the rating models used by the
rating agencies are flawed. Given only 3 relevant agencies that appear to use simi-
lar models, this creates a systematic risk. Therefore the ε-risk is likely to be priced.
C. Allocation of Losses to the FLP
As discussed before, the FLP should be higher, the stronger the information
asymmetry. This and the inverse relationship between information asymmetry and
asset pool quality motivate
Hypothesis 1. The lower the quality of the asset pool, the higher is the FLP.
This hypothesis can also be motivated by the rating methodology. Given the
rating of the lowest-rated tranche, a lower asset pool quality requires a higher FLP.
The size of the FLP9 is a crude measure of loss allocation to the FLP because
it does not take into account the loss distribution of the asset pool. In equilib-
rium, the loss exposure of the FLP relative to that of the rated tranches should be
balanced. An intuitive measure for relative loss exposure is the loss share. It is
defined as the expected loss borne by the FLP, divided by the expected loss of
the asset pool. Investors might view the loss share as an important signal of
balancing interests. Alternatively, consider the support probability of the FLP,
the probability that the asset pool losses are smaller than the FLP, and (1-support
probability), the probability that rated tranches are hit by default losses. According
to S&P and Fitch, this probability determines the rating of the tranche, which is
subordinate to all other rated tranches. It relates the loss allocation to quantile con-
siderations, as does the value at risk, which is commonly used to assess tail risk.
There is no equilibrium model that relates the loss share or the support prob-
ability to the asset pool quality. Investors may pay more attention to their expected
losses than to the support probability. Hence, we conjecture that there might be
an equilibrium loss share that is largely independent of asset pool quality. This
motivates
Hypothesis 2. The loss share of the FLP is independent of the asset pool quality.
Before testing this hypothesis, we present some theoretical properties. A de-
cline in DS or ADS, holding WADP constant, is modeled as a mean-preserving
8Gabaix, Krishnamurthy, and Vigneron (2007) find that prepayment risk is priced in mortgage-
backed securities transactions, even though it is a pure redistribution risk. They attribute this to limits
of arbitrage.
9The FLP can take different forms. In a true sale transaction, the FLP is the most junior tranche. It
may be supplemented by a reserve account in which interest surplus (interest revenue from the asset
pool minus interest expense on tranches) accrues over time. Default losses are then absorbed first by
the reserve account.
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Franke, Herrmann, and Weber 1133
spread in the loss rate distribution of the asset pool. An increase in WADP,
holding diversification constant, is modeled as a 1st-order stochastic dominance
shift in the loss rate distribution. Without loss of generality, we assume that the
asset pool has a par value of 1e. Then the default loss of the pool equals the
portfolio loss rate. Lemma 2 presents comparative statics of the loss allocation
measures with respect to asset pool quality, given the size of the FLP.
Lemma 2. Consider a securitization transaction, given the size of the FLP.
a) A decline in asset pool diversification
1) implies a lower expected loss for the FLP and a higher expected loss for the
rated tranches (including the TLP in case of a synthetic transaction); hence,
it reduces the share of expected losses of the asset pool borne by the FLP;
2) reduces the support probability of the FLP if the FLP is higher than the
loss rate at which the 2 cumulative probability distributions intersect. This
condition holds for a lognormal loss rate distribution and a nonrandom loss
given default λ for each loan/bond if and only if
FLP ≥ λWADP
√
1 +
1
WADP − 1
DS .(1)
b) An increase in the WADP of the asset pool
1) raises the expected loss of both, the rated tranches (including the TLP in the
case of a synthetic transaction) and the FLP,
2) reduces the support probability of the FLP,
3) reduces the share in expected losses of the asset pool borne by the FLP,
given a lognormal loss rate distribution, if
1− N(h + σ)− n(h + σ) 1
2σ
1
1 + WADP(DS− 1) ≥ 0,(2)
with h = ln
FLP
λ WADP
σ
− σ2 and σ2 = ln
(
1 +
1
WADP−1
DS
)
.
N(·) and n(·) denote the standard normal distribution function and the
standard normal probability density function, respectively.
Lemma 2a and 2b are well known except for the results regarding a lognormal
loss rate distribution, which are proved in Appendix 1.2 and 1.3.10 By Lemma 2a,
a decline in asset pool diversification redistributes default losses from the FLP to
the rated tranches. Hence, the loss share declines and the originator would benefit
more from adverse selection and moral hazard. By Lemma 2b, an increase in
WADP raises the expected losses of the FLP and of the rated tranches, and it
reduces the support probability. This, again, might alert investors.
10The Appendix is available from the 1st author.
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While these results are true for all probability distributions, the impact of
DS on the support probability and of WADP on the loss share depend on the
probability distribution. While Longstaff and Rajan (2008) derive a 3-modal loss
rate distribution, we use a unimodal distribution because the models used by
the rating agencies to simulate the default losses of the asset pool generate uni-
modal loss rate distributions. A distribution that approximates the probability
distribution derived from simulation models reasonably well is the lognormal
distribution. This was also used by Moody’s Investor Service (2000).11 For each
securitization transaction we translate the expected value and the standard
deviation of the loss rate of the asset pool into the 2 moments of a lognormal
distribution, as shown in Appendix 1.1. For each claim in the asset pool we
assume the same default probability WADP and the same loss given default λ.
Using the Black-Scholes (1973) model, the loss share s is given by s = N(h) +
(FLP/λWADP) (1– N(h +σ)), and the support probability is γ(FLP)= N(h +σ).
Lemma 2a states the condition for a decline of the DS to lower the support
probability, and Lemma 2b states the condition for an increase in WADP to lower
the loss share. These conditions are mostly satisfied in our sample. Therefore, we
start from the premise that a decline in asset pool quality reduces both the loss
share and the support probability, given the size of the FLP. Avoiding both effects
requires an increase of the FLP as stated in Hypothesis 1. If the originator adjusts
the FLP to asset pool quality so as to keep the loss share constant (Hypothesis 2),
then the support probability will change as stated in Lemma 3, which is proved in
Appendix 2.
Lemma 3. Assume a lognormal loss rate distribution. Suppose that the loss share
of the FLP is independent of the asset pool quality. Then the support probability of
the FLP is inversely related to the WADP and to the DS, if and only if
h < n(h + σ)/(1− N(h + σ)). Also, ∂ lnFLP/∂ lnWADP < 1.
Lemma 3 states a surprising testable result. Given a constant loss share and
the condition on h, the support probability of the FLP declines if one measure
of portfolio quality, the WADP, worsens, but it also declines if the other measure
of portfolio quality, the DS, improves. This shows that given a higher WADP, the
depressed support probability increases relatively more slowly than the depressed
loss share with the FLP, but given a lower DS, the depressed support probability
increases relatively faster than the depressed loss share with the FLP.
D. True Sale versus Synthetic Transactions
Our conjecture that information asymmetry plays a major role for the
allocation of losses to the FLP can be checked by comparing true sale and synthetic
transactions. In synthetic transactions, by strict subordination, the TLP does not
11The lognormal distribution implies a positive probability of a loss rate above 1. But this probabil-
ity is very small even for low-quality asset pools. Consider a transaction in which the WADP of loans
is very high with 20% and the DS is very low with 10. Then the probability of the implied lognormal
distribution for loss rates above 1 is 0.1%. In typical transactions, this probability would be much
smaller.
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Franke, Herrmann, and Weber 1135
serve as a credit enhancement for the rated tranches (SLP). Therefore, information
asymmetry should play a minor role for the allocation of losses to the TLP.
The choice between true sale and synthetic transactions is, however, driven also
by other considerations. For example, borrowers may not agree to a transfer of
the loan to another creditor. A true sale transaction would then be infeasible.
A synthetic transaction also avoids the operational risk associated with a property
transfer in a true sale transaction. Moreover, a synthetic transaction permits the
originator to short-sell default losses.
The originator may choose a synthetic transaction if she prefers to retain the
TLP risk and avoid the transaction cost of securitizing it. This preference should
be stronger for a stronger asset pool quality because then the TLP risk is smaller.
Therefore we state
Hypothesis 3. The preference for synthetic over true sale transactions increases
with asset pool quality.
A better asset pool quality reduces the attachment point of an Aaa tranche.
This is the contractually defined asset pool loss rate such that this tranche bears
losses only when the loss rate exceeds this rate. Hence a better asset pool
quality should raise the TLP (instead of lowering it as suggested for the FLP by
Hypothesis 1). This motivates
Hypothesis 4. In a synthetic transaction the nonsecuritized super-senior tranche
(TLP) increases with the quality of the asset pool.
Retaining the information-insensitive super-senior tranche is in stark contrast
to the literature. One explanation of this puzzle may be the funding cost. In a true
sale transaction the originator may freely use the proceeds from issuing tranches,
while synthetic transactions provide no funding. Hence, a bank’s choice between
true sale and synthetic transactions may also depend on the funding costs in a
true sale transaction versus those of standard bank bonds. We hypothesize that
banks with a very good rating have little incentive to use CDO transactions for
funding purposes, since they can obtain funds at low credit spreads anyway. This
motivates
Hypothesis 5. Synthetic [true sale] transactions are preferably used by banks with
a strong [weak] rating.
Interestingly, Hypotheses 3–5 can also be derived from optimal risk sharing
in a model with heterogeneous investor preferences (Malamud et al. (2009)).
E. CLO versus CBO Transactions
Next, compare CLO and CBO transactions. In a CLO transaction, the
originator should monitor the debtors so that a moral hazard problem exists. In a
CBO transaction, the originator is, as any other bond investor, in a remote position
vis-a`-vis the bond obligors so that she cannot effectively monitor them. Therefore,
credit spreads of CLOs may include a higher penalty for moral hazard. Also,
the potential for adverse selection may be stronger in CLO transactions because
more public information exists on bonds than on loans. These conjectures about
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109012000336
D
ow
nloaded from
 https:/w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core . U
niversity of B
asel Library , on 11 Jul 2017 at 08:10:29 , subject to the C
am
bridge C
ore term
s of use, available at https:/w
w
w
.cam
bridge.org/core/term
s .
1136 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
adverse selection and moral hazard are confirmed by some of the empirical stud-
ies on mortgage-backed securities quoted previously. Higher credit spreads in
CLO transactions should motivate the originator to mitigate this penalty through
a higher FLP. This leads to
Hypothesis 6. Given the same quality of the asset pool, the loss share of the FLP
is higher in CLO than in CBO transactions.
This hypothesis ignores reputation costs of the originator. Investors may
react to default losses they have to bear by imposing higher credit spreads on the
same originator in future securitizations. This generates a reputation cost. A high
reputation cost may induce a strong originator effort that partially substitutes for
the FLP. Hence, the FLP may be smaller in a CLO than in a CBO transaction.
Higgins and Mason (2004) document various cases in which banks voluntarily
absorbed default losses in credit card securitizations beyond the FLP so as to
reduce their reputation cost. This cost might invalidate Hypothesis 6. Second, this
hypothesis ignores the observation that default rates tend to be higher for bonds
than for loans of the same debtor (Emery and Cantor (2005)). Therefore, expected
losses could be higher for securitized bonds than for loans. This difference would
not show up in debtor ratings as opposed to debt claim ratings. Hence, investors
might insist on higher loss shares in CBO transactions.
IV. Empirical Findings
These hypotheses will be tested on a set of 169 European CDO transac-
tions of corporate loans and bonds, excluding other types of collateral such as
mortgages. Our data set includes all European CDO transactions from the end
of 1997 to the end of 2005 for which we know Moody’s DS and can derive
WADP.12 Information about transactions is taken from offering circulars, from
presale reports issued by Moody’s, and from the Deutsche Bank’s European Se-
curitization Almanac. The sample represents about 1/2 of all European CDO trans-
actions issued in the observation period.
A. Derivation of Asset Pool Quality
Since asset pool quality is essential for our analysis, we provide information
on how WADP and DS are derived. Rating agencies assign a rating to each
asset in the pool. For publicly rated assets, such as corporate bonds, current bond
ratings are used if derived in-house. The rating of another agency is lowered by
a defined number of rating steps (notches), mainly to account for the uncertainty
about the underlying rating model. For asset pools without publicly rated assets,
such as corporate loans, 3 rating approaches are typically employed.13 Moody’s
publishes a weighted average rating for the asset pool, based on the individual
12We include a few transactions without a rating from Moody’s where the average quality of the
underlying assets is known and also their diversification.
13The 3 rating approaches are: i) The 1st approach relies on the quality of the originator’s internal
rating system. It maps the originator’s rating scale to the agency’s rating scale. Mappings are moni-
tored regularly and adjusted if necessary. ii) The 2nd approach uses historical default loss data, often
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Franke, Herrmann, and Weber 1137
assets’ ratings. We use Moody’s tables to translate the weighted average rating of
an asset pool into the WADP.
The expected default loss rate of the asset pool equals λ WADP. Since we
mostly do not have transaction-specific information on loss given default, we
assume λ to be 50%, with few exceptions. This is in line with Acharya, Bharath,
and Srinivasan (2007), who document recovery rates for various loans and bonds
in the United States. They find an average recovery rate slightly above 50%. For
2 transactions with secured loans, we use λ = 25%. For mezzanine transactions
with subordinated and unsecured underlyings, we use λ = 100% as the rating
agencies do.
The loss allocation in a transaction also depends on the diversification of
the asset pool. Moody’s DS measures the diversification of the assets within and
across industries, taking into account also variations in asset size. DS is defined
as the number of claims of equal size and uncorrelated defaults, which gives the
same standard deviation of the asset pool loss rate distribution as that actually
observed. DS is defined by Moody’s as
DS =
m∑
k=1
G
{
nk∑
i=1
min
{
1,Fi/ ¯F
}}
.
Here, m denotes the number of industries, nk the number of claims against
obligors in industry k, Fi the par value of claim i, ¯F the average par value of all
claims, and G(y) is an increasing concave function starting at G(1) = 1 with a
maximum of 5 attained at y = 20. Hence, the maximum DS within an industry
is 5. The DS ranges between 1 and 135. DS = 1 indicates “no diversification,”
and DS = 135 indicates “excellent diversification.”
The DS has been criticized on various grounds (Fender and Kiff (2004)).
Therefore, in 2000, Moody’s started to use an adjusted DS (ADS). The ADS
explicitly takes into account asset correlations of obligors within an industry, ρin,
and between industries, ρex. Given equal-sized loans, Fender and Kiff show that
ADS = n
2
n + ρex n (n− 1) + (ρin − ρex)
m∑
k=1
nk (nk − 1)
.
For example, consider a transaction with 15 industries and 10 loans of equal
size in each industry, assuming ρin = 20%. Then the ADS with ρex = 0% is
about 39. But with ρex = 2% and 4% it would be about 23 and 16, respectively,
indicating the sensitivity of the ADS to ρex. Given 10 industries and 6 loans
of equal size in each industry, the DS is similar to the ADS if ρin = 20% and
ρex = 0% (Fender and Kiff (2004)).
Deriving ADS with 2 correlation coefficients only is clearly a simplification.
This shrinkage approach may have some merits in view of the difficulties of
called the statistical/actuarial approach, in line with the agency’s published recovery assumptions.
iii) The 3rd approach uses proprietary credit risk information systems (i.e., a database/scoring model
of corporate accounting data) in order to calculate an expected default rate for each obligor, using
recovery assumptions. Examples include Moody’s KMV RiscCalcTMand S&P’s Credit Risk Tracker.
The 3 approaches can be used in combination.
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1138 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
estimating correlations. An approach with 2 correlation parameters would follow
from a KMV-portfolio model like that of Gordy (2003) in which the asset returns
of the indebted companies are driven by 1 systematic macro factor, orthogonal
industry factors, and idiosyncratic factors. For each company, the correlation be-
tween the asset return and the macro factor would equal ρex and the (additional)
correlation between the asset return and the industry factor would be (ρin − ρex).
We know Moody’s DS for all 169 transactions. For 92 transactions we have
enough information about industry diversification to carefully derive the ADS.
In line with Moody’s and S&P, we derive the ADS assuming an intraindustry asset
correlation ρin of 20% and an interindustry asset correlation ρex of 2%. Alterna-
tively, we use interindustry correlations of 0% and 4% for a robustness check. We
use Moody’s DS to analyze the full sample and, in addition, the ADS to analyze
the reduced sample of 92 transactions. We refer to this subset whenever we use
the lognormal loss rate distribution.
B. Descriptive Statistics and Methodology
Table 1 gives the distribution of the 169 transactions across CLO/CBO and
true sale/synthetic transactions and across years. Here, 57% of the transactions
are CBO transactions; 54% are synthetic. Some 136 transactions are arranged by
banks, and 33 by investment firms. The latter buy existing bonds and securitize
them. Of these 33 transactions, 15 also include some loans. We classify these
transactions as CBO transactions. Of the CBO transactions, 1/3 are originated by
investment firms.
TABLE 1
Number of Transactions
Panel A of Table 1 reports the number of transactions in the sample differentiating CLO and CBO transactions as well as
true sale and synthetic transactions. Panel B gives the annual distribution of transactions.
Panel A. Number of Transactions Differentiated for CLO/CBO and True Sale/Synthetic
True Sale Synthetic Total
CLO 30 43 73
CBO 48 48 96
Total 78 91 169
Panel B. Distribution of Transactions over Time
Year
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
No. of transactions 1 1 12 26 40 42 16 19 12
Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of WADP, DS, FLP, and
TLP in synthetic transactions. Using a loss given default of 50% with a few
exceptions, the expected default loss of an asset pool is about 1/2 the WADP.
The data are presented separately for the 4 subsamples of true sale/CLO,
synthetic/CLO, true sale/CBO, and synthetic/CBO transactions. Table 2 indicates
several interesting properties. The mean of the WADP is much higher for true sale
than synthetic transactions. It is also clearly higher for synthetic CLO than syn-
thetic CBO transactions. On average, CLO transactions are much better diversified
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Franke, Herrmann, and Weber 1139
than CBO transactions. In a CLO transaction a bank can easily securitize many
loans from its loan book to obtain a high DS. Buying bonds is often costly, since
the bond market is rather illiquid. Therefore the DS tends to be smaller in CBO
transactions.
TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations of transaction characteristics differentiating CLO and CBO transac-
tions as well as true sale (TS) and synthetic (SYN) transactions. WADP and Moody’s DS are the weighted average default
probability and Moody’s diversity score of the asset pool, respectively. FLP is the initial size of the FLP, and TLP the nonse-
curitized senior tranche as a percentage of the asset pool volume in synthetic transactions. The numbers in parentheses
for TLP in CLO transactions are obtained if 3 fully funded synthetic Geldilux transactions are excluded.
TS/CLO SYN/CLO TS/CBO SYN/CBO
WADP: mean 7.5% 3.8% 13.2% 1.9%
WADP: std. 7.5% 3.1% 9.8% 3.2%
DS: mean 87 89 34 56
DS: std. 46 30 11 26
FLP: mean 6.1% 2.9% 12.1% 3.6%
FLP: std. 4.8% 1.5% 6.2% 2.6%
TLP: mean 80% (86%) 87%
TLP: std. 23% (7%) 7%
The average size of the FLP is higher for true sale than for synthetic trans-
actions, and within these subsets it is higher for CBO than for CLO transac-
tions. The average size of the FLP exceeds the average expected loss, which is
about 1/2 of the WADP. Thus, the averages satisfy the condition in Lemma 2a.
Also, the average size of the FLP is smaller than the average WADP, except
for synthetic CBO transactions. The condition in Lemma 2b and the condition
h < n(h + σ)/(1 − N(h + σ)) in Lemma 3 always hold, based on an ADS with
ρex = 2%. The average TLP in synthetic transactions is about 87% of the as-
set pool volume with a standard deviation of only 7% if we exclude 3 atypical
Geldilux transactions. These are the only fully funded synthetic CLO transactions
(i.e., TLP = 0).
In the following we test the hypotheses presented in Section III. We hypoth-
esize that loss allocation depends on asset pool quality, on other characteristics
of the securitization transaction, and on exogenous factors such as the attitudes of
investors and rating agencies, market imperfections, and originator characteristics.
The function relating loss allocation to all these factors is assumed to be the same
for all CDO transactions. We try to find out the properties of this function. One
difficulty of this approach is that the originator simultaneously chooses asset pool
quality and loss allocation. Asset pool quality cannot be viewed as an exogenous
determinant of loss allocation, and vice versa. Yet, if a function exists that relates
loss allocation to asset pool quality in equilibrium, then the best the originator
can do is to adhere to this function. Originator characteristics are likely to affect
loss allocation. Therefore, we include various characteristics of originating banks
as controls. Moreover, we run the regressions for loss allocation separately for the
4 subsets of true sale/CLO, true sale/CBO, synthetic/CLO, and synthetic/CBO
transactions to find out whether these subsets differ systematically.
Banks and investment firms are originators. While many characteristics of
banks are known, those of investment firms are largely unknown. We include
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the following bank control variables, obtained from the Bank Scope Database:
i) Basel ratios: the tier 1 capital ratio and the total capital ratio; ii) capital structure:
equity/total assets; iii) asset structure: loans/total assets; iv) profitability: return
on average equity capital in the transaction year, the average return for 1994–
2004, and the standard deviation of these returns as a proxy for profitability risk;
v) Tobin’s Q to proxy for the bank’s growth potential; and vi) the bank’s rating
to proxy for its funding cost. Rating is always captured by an integer variable that
equals −1 for an Aaa rating and declines by 1 for every notch, with −16 for a
rating of B3.
For each characteristic we attach a residual dummy RD = 1 to those orig-
inators for which the characteristic is not known, otherwise RD = 0. We use
regressions of the type
y = a + b x1 + c(1− RD)Δx2 + d RD + ε,(3)
where x1 is the vector of explaining variables other than originator characteristics,
Δx2 the vector of (bank characteristics − its sample average), and ε the usual
error term. This approach implies that for banks with a known characteristic,
the variation in this zero-mean characteristic is taken into consideration, while
for the other originators a fixed effect is assumed. If a variable does not add to the
explanatory power of a regression, then we often eliminate it from the regression.
We always run the regressions with constants, but to save space we do not always
report their values.
C. The Quality of the Asset Pool
The quality of the underlying asset pool is a core variable. Asset pool
quality and loss allocation may be interdependent. Therefore, we ask 3 questions:
i) Does the originator follow a homogeneous quality policy, that is, is a low (high)
WADP associated with a high (low) DS? ii) Does loss allocation affect WADP
and DS? iii) Do originator characteristics affect the choice of asset pool quality?
Figure 1 illustrates the relation between WADP and DS (Graph A) and the ADS2
(Graph B), respectively. Neither figure indicates a strong relation between WADP
and asset pool diversification. Hence, the figures provide, at best, partial support
for homogeneous quality choice.
Next, we run ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions to check the relation
between WADP and DS. In Table 3, we first regress WADP for all 169 transactions
on the inverse lnDS and originator characteristics. DS turns out to be insignificant.
Investment firms and banks with a higher total capital ratio tend to choose asset
pools with higher WADP. Banks with a strong equity buffer might take higher
default risks, which they then securitize. Other originator characteristics have no
significant impact. In accordance with Table 2, true sale CBO transactions have
significantly higher WADPs.
Since the choice of WADP might differ for subsets of transactions, we also
run the 1st regression separately for TS/CLO, TS/CBO, SYN/CLO, and SYN/
CBO transactions. The regression coefficient of the inverse lnDS is significant
only for the 30 true sale CLO transactions (2nd regression in Table 3); a higher
DS tends to lower WADP.
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FIGURE 1
Diversity Scores and Weighted Average Default Probabilities
Graph A of Figure 1 shows a scatter plot of Moody’s diversity score (DS) and the weighted average default probability
(WADP) for 169 transactions. Graph B shows the adjusted diversity score (ADS) with ρex = 0.02 and the WADP for 92
transactions.
Graph A. DS and WADP Graph B. ADS2 and WADP
TABLE 3
Results for WADP
Table 3 reports the coefﬁcients (Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity-adjusted p-values in parentheses) of OLS regres-
sions of WADP on various variables, without showing the regression constants. Inverse lnADS2 is the inverse log-adjusted
diversity score assuming a default correlation between industries of 2%. The investment ﬁrm dummy variable is 1 if an
investment ﬁrm is the originator, and 0 otherwise. The CBO dummy variable is 1 for a CBO transaction, and 0 otherwise.
The synthetic dummy variable is 1 for a synthetic transaction, and 0 otherwise. The ΔTotal capital ratio is the total capital
ratio of the originating bank in the transaction year minus the average total capital ratio in the sample (see equation (3)).
The adjusted R2 is shown in the last row.
Explained Variable WADP (%)
Sample of 30 TS, 48 TS, 43 SYN, 48 SYN,
Transactions All 169 CLO CBO CLO CBO 92 92
Inverse lnDS −4.7 92.2 3.0 −17.2 −0.54
(0.6860) (0.0209) (0.9096) (0.4890) (0.9582)
Inverse lnADS2 8.63 −3.78
(0.3791) (0.6785)
Investment ﬁrm dummy 9.5 0.40 13.17 −0.26 5.41 8.57
(0.0000) (0.9284) (0.0000) (0.7481) (0.0028) (0.0247)
Loss share× CBO −7.87
(0.2695)
Loss share× (1 – CBO) −9.41
(0.2623)
Support Prob× CBO −27.1
(0.0000)
Support Prob× (1 – CBO) −28.9
(0.0000)
CBO dummy 6.9
(1− Synthetic dummy) (0.0000)
ΔTotal capital ratio 1.2 0.95 3.056 0.541 0.306 0.259 0.898
(0.0021) (0.1633) (0.0000) (0.1536) (0.1649) (0.2517) (0.0951)
Adj. R2 0.508 0.221 0.602 0.0397 −0.0553 0.650 0.180
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1142 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Also, loss allocation might affect the choice of asset pool quality. As Table 2
indicates, a higher WADP tends to lead to a higher FLP. When we include FLP
in the regression, we find a strongly significant, positive regression coefficient
(not shown). But due to endogeneity issues, it would be dangerous to conclude
that a higher FLP generates a higher WADP. The loss share and the support
probability are less prone to endogeneity problems. Therefore, we use them as
regressors. Since both are sensitive to diversification, we use the subsample of
92 transactions for which we know the more reliable ADS2, using an interindus-
try asset correlation ρex of 2%. Since loss sharing may differ for CLO and CBO
transactions, we multiply the loss measures by the CBO or (1 − CBO) dummy
variables. The last 2 regressions in Table 3 indicate that the ADS2 coefficient
is insignificant, while the investment firm dummy variable has a positive and
significant impact on WADP. The support probability coefficient is strongly sig-
nificant and negative for both CBO and CLO transactions, but the loss share is
insignificant. By Lemma 3, one of these loss measures should have a clear impact
if the other one does not. We defer a more detailed discussion of these findings to
the next subsection.
Table 4 reports regressions to explain DS and ADS2. For the full sample
of 169 transactions, the inverse lnDS does not depend significantly on WADP,
and the investment firm dummy variable is insignificant. As suggested by
Table 2, DS is lower for CBO transactions, but higher for synthetic transac-
tions. The total capital ratio coefficient is only weakly significant. Other originator
TABLE 4
Results for DS and ADS2
Table 4 reports the coefﬁcients (Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity-adjusted p-values in parentheses) for OLS regres-
sions of 1/lnDS and 1/lnADS2 on various variables, without showing the regression constants. The investment ﬁrm dummy
variable is 1 if an investment ﬁrm is the originator, and 0 otherwise. The CBO dummy variable is 1 for a CBO transaction,
and 0 otherwise. The synthetic dummy variable is 1 for a synthetic transaction, and 0 otherwise. The ΔTotal capital ratio is
the total capital ratio of the originating bank in the transaction year minus the average total capital ratio in the sample (see
equation (3)). The adjusted R2 is shown in the last row.
Explained Variable Inverse lnDS Inverse lnADS2
Sample of 30 TS, 48 TS, 43 SYN, 48 SYN,
Transactions All 169 CLO CBO CLO CBO 92 92
WADP (%) 4.85 18.5 1.27 −8.46 −0.69 −0.017 −0.095
(0.3376) (0.0579) (0.9069) (0.5791) (0.9585) (0.8475) (0.2047)
Investment ﬁrm dummy 0.004 0.047 −0.0118 −0.0155 −0.002 −0.0013
(0.6763) (0.0141) (0.3448) (0.0358) (0.7910) (0.8733)
Loss share× CBO 0.059
(0.0550)
Loss share× (1 – CBO) 0.042
(0.1243)
Support Prob× CBO 0.048
(0.0163)
Support Prob× (1 – CBO) 0.030
(0.1225)
CBO dummy 0.040
(0.0000)
Synthetic dummy −0.018 −0.030 −0.029
(0.0645) (0.0258) (0.0225)
ΔTotal capital ratio −0.008 −0.001 −0.011 −0.0016 −0.019 0.000 −0.000
(0.0219) (0.7187) (0.0242) (0.2935) (0.1355) (0.9745) (0.9821)
Adj. R2 0.347 0.472 0.049 −0.013 0.209 0.182 0.186
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Franke, Herrmann, and Weber 1143
characteristics appear to be irrelevant. In separate regressions for each of the
4 subsamples, we only find a significant WADP coefficient for the subsample
of 30 true sale CLO transactions (2nd regression in Table 4), in line with the sig-
nificant coefficient of DS on WADP in Table 3. We also check the subsample of
92 transactions to find out whether loss allocation has any relation to ADS2 (last
2 regressions in Table 4). The support probability coefficient is significant for the
CBO, but not for the CLO transactions. The loss share coefficient is weakly sig-
nificant only in CBO transactions. Hence, similar to Table 3, there is very little
support for dependence between DS and WADP.
While DS is primarily driven by CLO versus CBO transactions, an endo-
geneity problem regarding the impact of DS on WADP might exist. Therefore,
we run a 2-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to explain WADP. As the DS is
much higher in CLO than in CBO transactions, we use the CBO dummy variable
as an instrumental variable for DS. The findings of this exercise do not support an
endogeneity effect.
In summary, the choices of WADP and DS appear to be independent.
Investment firms and banks with higher total capital ratios appear to prefer trans-
actions with higher WADPs. Otherwise, originator characteristics do not seem to
be relevant. While WADP is partly explained by the support probability, the loss
share explains neither WADP nor ADS.
D. Loss Allocation to the FLP
1. Size of FLP
Now the core hypotheses on loss sharing will be tested. Hypothesis 1 states
that the size of the FLP is inversely related to the quality of the asset pool. This
hypothesis is strongly confirmed by the regressions in Table 5. The first 2 regres-
sions are based on the full sample of 169 transactions using the DS, while the last
regression is based on the subsample of 92 transactions using ADS. The results
indicate that even for an asset pool with excellent quality, given by a WADP close
to 0 and a DS of 135, the FLP is positive. Using the coefficients of the 1st regres-
sion, the estimated FLP equals −8.5 + 46.6/ln 135= 1.00 (%). This suggests that
investors are concerned about information asymmetry and other potential prob-
lems of securitization transactions even if the published asset pool quality is very
good. It may also explain why the FLP increases with WADP at a slope below the
loss given default of 1/2. Interestingly, the regression coefficient of the synthetic
dummy variable is significantly negative in the 2nd regression, but insignificant
in the last regression, which uses the more sophisticated diversification measure.
We also regress the FLP size on asset pool quality for the 4 subsets of trans-
actions. The results (regressions 3–6) are very similar for true sale CLOs and for
true sale CBOs. For synthetic CLOs and synthetic CBOs, WADP still remains
strongly significant, but inverse lnDS turns insignificant. It may be that investors
are less concerned about diversification in synthetic transactions because they
interpret the TLP as a strong quality signal.
We also check whether the FLP is higher in a managed (dynamic) transaction
than in a static transaction. In the 2nd and the last regression, the dummy variable
being 1 for a managed transaction, and 0 otherwise, is insignificant. This may be
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TABLE 5
Results for the Size of the FLP
Table 5 reports the coefﬁcients (Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity-adjusted p-values in parentheses) for OLS re-
gressions explaining the size of the FLP. WADP is the weighted average default probability of the asset pool. Inverse
lnADS2 is the inverse log-adjusted diversity score assuming a default correlation between industries of 2%. The synthetic
dummy variable is 1 for a synthetic transaction, and 0 otherwise. The CBO dummy variable is 1 for a CBO transaction, and
0 otherwise. The managed dummy variable is 1 for a managed transaction, and 0 otherwise. The adjusted R2 is shown in
the last row.
Explained Variable Size of FLP (%)
43 SYN, 48 SYN,
Sample of Transactions 169 169 30 TS, CLO 48 TS, CBO CLO CBO 92
Constant −8.50 −5.25 −11.83 −15.88 2.60 4.76 −15.0
(0.0188) (0.1865) (0.0006) (0.0611) (0.1953) (0.0341) (0.0421)
WADP (%) 0.347 0.296 0.294 0.237 0.309 0.447 0.356
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0027) (0.0002) (0.0159) (0.0000)
Inverse lnDS 46.6 40.5 65.7 79.5 −4.19 −8.15
(0.0028) (0.0117) (0.0001) (0.0056) (0.6068) (0.3278)
Inverse lnADS2 60.4
(0.0095)
Synthetic dummy −2.07 −1.03
(0.0029) (0.1345)
CBO dummy 0.14 0.82
(0.7963) (0.2022)
Managed dummy −0.49 −0.68
(0.4417) (0.3263)
Adj. R2 0.546 0.574 0.766 0.343 0.393 0.328 0.625
due to the strict rules on replenishment/substitution. Also, originator characteris-
tics have no impact on the size of the FLP. Originators with more valuable real
options as indicated by Tobin’s Q do not seem to prefer a smaller FLP.
We also run the FLP regressions including the issuance date and the iBoxx
spread as regressors. The iBoxx spread is the difference between the iBoxx for
BBB bonds and the government iBoxx for a maturity of 3–5 years. Both regressors
have no significant impact (not shown). The insignificant issuance date coefficient
does not support the claim that the rating agencies relaxed their rating standards
over time, implying smaller FLPs. Finally, we run the regression for the subsam-
ple of 92 transactions with ADSs based on interindustry correlations ρex of 0%
or 4%. We do not report the results because they are very similar to those for
ρex = 2%.
2. Loss Share and Support Probability
Next, we analyze the relation between asset pool quality and sophisticated
loss-sharing measures. Using the interindustry correlation ρex=2%, the loss share
of the FLP has a mean of 86.1% and a standard deviation of only 8.4%. This
indicates that the FLP takes a high share of the expected default losses. For
the support probability, the mean is 87.6% and the standard deviation 14.7%.
This mean is also quite high. In accordance with Lemma 2a, the average loss
share declines from 91.6% to 82.3% if ρex increases from 0% to 4%, and the
average support probability declines slightly from 88.25% to 87.57%. Surpris-
ingly, the support probability is almost constant. This indicates that the cumulative
lognormal distributions, generated by different interindustry correlations, intersect
at loss rates that are only slightly below the FLP.
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When regressing the loss share on WADP and inverse lnADS2 only, it turns
out that WADP is completely insignificant, while the coefficient of the inverse
ADS2 is positive and significant (Table 6, 1st regression). However, the explana-
tory power of the regression is only about 5.6%. Adding the CBO dummy variable
as a regressor strongly weakens the significance of the ADS2 coefficient. The
CBO coefficient is strongly significant, positive indicating a higher loss share in
CBO transactions. The average loss share is 83.7% in CLO and 90% in CBO
transactions, invalidating Hypothesis 6. This is consistent with higher expected
losses of securitized bonds versus loans as well as with a strong reputation cost for
default losses in CLO transactions. This cost might induce a strong (unobservable)
monitoring effort of the originator in these transactions that partially substitutes
for the loss share. But it also points to operational risk in CLO transactions. If
an originator does not intend future securitization transactions, she might not
care about reputation costs and enjoy the private benefits of moral hazard. Again,
the coefficients of the issuance date and the iBoxx spread are insignificant
(not shown).
We also run the 1st regression in Table 6 separately for the 4 subsets of
transactions (regressions 3–6). For true sale CLOs, synthetic CLOs, and synthetic
CBOs, WADP and inverse lnADS2 have no significance, and the adjusted R2s
are negative or slightly above 0. Only for the small sample of 15 true sale CBOs
do we find a strongly significant negative effect of WADP, driven by 4 transac-
tions with a WADP above 20%, while all other transactions have a WADP below
6% (4th regression in Table 6). Apart from these few transactions, the empirical
evidence clearly indicates that the loss share is largely independent of portfolio
quality. This conclusion is also supported by the regressions in Tables 3 and 4,
where the loss share adds nothing or little to the explanation of asset pool quality.
Thus, Hypothesis 2 is clearly supported.
Next, we run similar regressions for the support probability (right-hand side
of Table 6). For the full sample of 92 transactions, the WADP effect is strongly
significant and negative. ADS2 is weakly significant, but insignificant if the CBO
dummy variable is included. These 2 regressions have an impressive explana-
tory power of about 60%. These findings are not surprising in view of the previ-
ous finding that the loss share is independent of the asset pool quality. Lemma 3
then implies that the support probability should react inversely to WADP and to
ADS. Again, the issuance date and the iBoxx spread have no significant effects.
Analyzing the 4 subsets of transactions separately (last 4 regressions), WADP
always has a strongly significant negative impact, while inverse lnADS2 has a
positive impact that, however, is significant only for synthetic CBOs. Hence, we
conclude that the support probability varies with asset pool quality, in particular
WADP, while the loss share does not. A loss share that is largely independent of
the asset pool quality appears to be the market norm. These findings need not nec-
essarily be driven by information asymmetry, because we can only test for effects
of asset pool quality.
More importantly, adding originator characteristics as regressors does not
improve the explanatory power (not shown). Hence, loss allocation appears to be
driven by market forces, not by originator characteristics. This may be surprising
if one believes in the cooperation of originators and rating agencies to maximize
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TABLE 6
Results for the Share of Expected Losses and the Support Probability of the FLP
Table 6 reports the coefﬁcients (Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity-adjusted p-values in parentheses) for OLS regressions explaining the share of expected losses of the FLP and the support probability of
the FLP. WADP is the weighted average default probability of the asset pool. Inverse lnADS2 is the inverse log-adjusted diversity score assuming a default correlation between industries of 2%. The CBO dummy
variable is 1 for a CBO transaction, and 0 otherwise. Date is the issuance date. The adjusted R2 is shown in the last row.
Share of Expected Losses (%) Support Probability (%)
Sample of 20 TS, 15 TS, 34 SYN, 23 SYN, 20 TS, 15 TS, 34 SYN, 23 SYN,
Transactions 92 92 CLO CBO CLO CBO 92 92 CLO CBO CLO CBO
Constant 67.3 69.4 71.3 94.1 120.9 30.8 74.8 80.2 72.4 103.7 78.7 62.8
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0532) (0.0000) (0.0018) (0.4341) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0936) (0.0000) (0.0687) (0.0027)
WADP (%) −0.124 −0.121 0.325 −0.556 −0.35 0.187 −1.99 −2.00 −1.46 −2.31 −4.07 −0.63
(0.2950) (0.3556) (0.1326) (0.0007) (0.6195) (0.2308) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Inverse lnADS2 61.7 40.4 36.5 6.63 −122.0 187.9 64.6 43.2 65.9 1.08 69.3 111.6
(0.0145) (0.0687) (0.7537) (0.7277) (0.3243) (0.1432) (0.0613) (0.1476) (0.6275) (0.9456) (0.6308) (0.0664)
CBO dummy 6.38 5.99
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Date 0.14 0.08
(0.2680) (0.6777)
Adj. R2 0.056 0.166 −0.056 0.620 −0.023 0.014 0.593 0.632 0.395 0.958 0.486 0.035
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their joint benefit. As a caveat, our set of originator characteristics may miss some
relevant characteristics.
The assumption of a lognormal loss rate distribution is sometimes criticized.
If one simulates the loss rate distribution of a loan portfolio period by period, it
turns out that the distribution is in some cases better approximated by a gamma
distribution. Therefore, we check robustness by using a 2-parameter gamma
distribution. For each transaction, the expected loss rate and the loss rate variance,
based on ADS2, are translated into the parameters of a gamma distribution. While
for the 92 transactions the average loss share (average support probability) assum-
ing a lognormal distribution is 86.1% (87.6%), it is 84.3% (85.7%) assuming a
gamma distribution. Hence, it is not surprising that the regression results for loss
shares and support probabilities based on the gamma distribution (not shown) are
similar to those based on the lognormal distribution.
E. Loss Allocation to the TLP
Comparing true sale and synthetic transactions permits us to better under-
stand the determinants of loss allocation. Hypothesis 3 claims that synthetic
transactions are preferred for high-quality asset pools. This hypothesis is clearly
supported by the 1st probit regression in Table 7. It is also supported if we
analyze CLO and CBO transactions separately (2nd and 3rd regressions). For
CLO transactions the DS effect is insignificant, perhaps because these transactions
tend to be well diversified.
TABLE 7
Results for the Synthetic Dummy Variable
Table 7 reports the coefﬁcients (with p-values in parentheses) of binary probit regressions explaining the synthetic dummy
variable, without showing the regression constants. The synthetic dummy variable is 1 for a synthetic transaction, and
0 otherwise. iBoxx spread is the spread between the BBB iBoxx and the government iBoxx for 3–5 years maturity.
The ΔOriginator’s rating is the originator’s rating minus the average originator rating in the sample (see equation (3)).
TheΔTobin’s Q andΔTotal capital ratio are deﬁned analogously. The Originator rating dummy variable is 1 for originators
without a rating, and 0 otherwise. The last row shows the McFadden R2.
Explained Variable Synthetic Dummy
Sample of Transactions 169 73 CLO 96 CBO 151 151 151
WADP (%) −0.11 −0.077 −0.135 −0.10 −0.11
(0.0000) (0.0275) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Inverse lnDS −6.71 −3.47 −11.43 −6.86 −6.19
(0.0050) (0.5212) (0.0014) (0.0085) (0.0523)
iBoxx spread (%) 0.879
(0.0098)
ΔOriginator’s rating 0.225 0.22 0.33
(0.0033) (0.0107) (0.0013)
Originator rating dummy −1.54 −1.29 −0.77
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.0631)
ΔTobin’s Q −1.12
(0.0001)
ΔTotal capital ratio 0.198
(0.0947)
McFadden R2 0.265 0.085 0.503 0.190 0.362 0.440
Hypothesis 5 claims that originators with a good rating are less interested
in funding through securitization. The 4th regression supports this hypothesis,
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showing a significant, positive impact of the originator rating, while the origina-
tors without a rating, mostly investment firms, appear to prefer true sale trans-
actions. Combining originator rating and portfolio quality in the 5th regression
clearly improves the explanatory power of the regression.
In the last regression, the explanatory power is further improved by including
the iBoxx spread, the originator’s Tobin’s Q, and her total capital ratio. The iBoxx
spread has a significant, positive impact on the preference for synthetic transac-
tions. Hence, it appears that originators are less interested in funding through
securitization when credit spreads are high. The issuance date is insignificant (not
shown). The significant, negative coefficient of Tobin’s Q suggests that it may
not pay for originators with attractive outside options to retain the risk of a TLP.
Originators with a high total capital ratio may prefer to retain the TLP risk because
their cost of retention may be smaller than that of selling.
We interpret the strong preference for synthetic transactions of originators
with a good rating as evidence of a funding cost effect. This effect may dominate
information-sensitivity effects and explain why the FLP, the most information-
sensitive tranche, is at least partly sold, while the TLP, the least information-
sensitive tranche, is not. Graph A of Figure 2 shows credit spreads of European
bank bonds with a maturity of at least 4 years, rated Aa3 and better, issued
between 2000 and 2005. Graph B shows the credit spreads of Aaa-rated CDO
tranches with a maturity of at least 4 years in our sample. The mean credit spread
is 9.1 basis points (bp) for the bank bonds and 40.6 bp for the Aaa tranches. The
minimum (maximum) spread of the bank bonds is −27 (+22) bp, while it is +1
(+100) bp for the Aaa tranches.14 Hence, credit spreads of highly rated bank bonds
are often lower than those of Aaa tranches.
FIGURE 2
Credit Spreads of Bank Bonds and Aaa Tranches
Graph A of Figure 2 shows a histogram of the credit spreads over Euro Interbank Offered Rate/London Interbank Offered
Rate (EURIBOR/LIBOR) of 118 European bank bonds with a maturity of at least 4 years, rated Aa3 or better, issued between
2000 and 2005. Data are obtained from DealScan. Graph B shows the credit spreads over EURIBOR/LIBOR of the 135
Aaa-rated CDO tranches with a maturity of at least 4 years of our securitization sample.
Graph A. Credit Spreads of Bank Bonds Graph B. Credit Spreads of Aaa Tranches
14Similar to Aaa tranches, standard bonds issued by large, well-rated banks also represent
well-diversified risks. They predominantly default in very bad macro states, similar to Aaa tranches.
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In Table 8, we regress the credit spreads of bank bonds and CDO tranches
with a rating of at least Aa3 on the iBoxx spread, negative rating, squared
rating, and bond maturity. Table 8 indicates that the spreads of bank bonds and
CDO tranches are lower for a better rating and a shorter maturity. The tranche
spreads increase with a higher iBoxx spread, while the bank bond spreads do not.
To illustrate the funding decision, compare the estimated credit spread of an
Aa2-bank bond and of an Aaa tranche for a true sale transaction, given 5 years
maturity and an iBoxx spread of 2%. The estimated credit spread of the Aa2-bank
bond is 7.9 bp, and that of the Aaa tranche is 42.7 bp. Thus, for highly rated
banks, funding through a large Aaa tranche in a true sale transaction likely im-
plies a higher funding cost than issuing standard Aa2 bonds. These banks may
enjoy a strong reputation, which is not fully reflected in their bond rating, but in
their credit spreads. Also, investors may believe that big banks are too big to fail.
Conversely, an Aaa tranche in a securitization transaction may face some investor
skepticism because securitization transactions are relatively new instruments with
little performance history.
TABLE 8
Results for the Credit Spreads of Bank Bonds and CDO Tranches
Table 8 reports the coefﬁcients (Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity-adjusted p-values in parentheses) for OLS regres-
sions explaining the credit spreads of European bank bonds and CDO tranches with a rating of Aa3 and better. Rating
is −1 for Aaa, −2 for Aa1, −3 for Aa2, and −4 for Aa3. iBoxx spread is the spread between the BBB iBoxx and the
government iBoxx for 3–5 years maturity. The synthetic dummy variable is 1 for a synthetic transaction, and 0 otherwise.
The adjusted R2 is shown in the last row.
Credit Spread Credit Spread
Explained Variable of Bank Bonds of CDO Tranches
No. of obs. 118 226
Constant −7.99 −21.3
(0.0273) (0.0419)
iBoxx spread (%) −0.695 11.85
(0.5545) (0.0055)
– Rating 5.01 32.46
(0.0390) (0.0011)
Rating2 −0.312 −3.93
(0.5040) (0.0787)
Maturity of bond 1.002 2.36
(0.0000) (0.0037)
Synthetic dummy 4.51
(0.2272)
Adj. R2 0.286 0.420
Finally, we analyze the size of the TLP. We exclude the 3 atypical fully
funded Geldilux transactions. In the 1st regression of Table 9, WADP has
a strongly negative effect on the size of the TLP, while the impact of lnDS is
U-shaped. For small DSs up to about 28, the estimated TLP declines with an in-
creasing DS, and for higher DSs it increases. There are only a few transactions
with a DS below 28. Therefore, the TLP mostly increases with the DS. Thus,
Hypothesis 4 is clearly confirmed. Differentiating between CLO and CBO trans-
actions (2nd and 3rd regressions) shows similar results. But the DS turns insignif-
icant in the strongly diversified CLO transactions. The explanatory power of the
1st regression can be improved slightly by including the investment firm dummy
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variable (last regression). The negative coefficient indicates that investment firms
tend to retain smaller TLPs. Other originator characteristics do not appear to have
a significant impact on the size of the TLP. Also, the issuance date and the iBoxx
spread appear to be irrelevant.
TABLE 9
Results for the Size of the TLP
Table 9 reports the coefﬁcients (Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity-adjusted p-values in parentheses) of OLS regres-
sions explaining the size of the TLP in synthetic transactions. The investment ﬁrm dummy variable is 1 if the originator is
an investment ﬁrm, and 0 otherwise. The sample contains 86 transactions. The adjusted R2 is shown in the last row.
Explained Variable Size of TLP (%)
Sample of Transactions 86 40 CLO 46 CBO 86
Constant −0.066 0.958 −0.162 −0.017
(0.7861) (0.6657) (0.4871) (0.9462)
WADP (%) −0.015 −0.018 −0.014 −0.015
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
lnDS 0.14 0.025 0.16 0.14
(0.0000) (0.9224) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Inverse lnDS 1.56 −0.60 1.73 1.47
(0.0007) (0.8987) (0.0001) (0.0017)
Investment ﬁrm dummy −0.06
(0.0007)
Adj. R2 0.576 0.592 0.544 0.588
Comparing our findings for the FLP and TLP, the differences are striking.
While the FLP size reacts inversely to asset pool quality, the TLP increases. This
indicates that the choices are driven by different motives. Presumably, the FLP
mitigates problems of information asymmetry; a lower asset pool quality induces
a higher FLP, providing more protection to investors. The TLP does not protect
investors so that investor protection is irrelevant. Better asset pool quality lowers
the Aaa-attachment point so that the TLP increases. Yet, the TLP should be sold,
since it is least information sensitive. But funding through Aaa tranches is not
attractive for highly rated banks. This is reinforced in times of high credit spreads.
Also, selling a large Aaa tranche transfers little default risk, so that banks may
consider it a cost-ineffective tool for risk management.
F. Robustness Checks and Discussion
A potential critique of OLS regressions to explain the FLP and the TLP is
that these variables are constrained to the (0,1) range. For a robustness check we
transform the FLP and the TLP so that the transformed variable varies between
plus and minus infinity. The regression results basically stay the same.
We already checked for potential endogeneity problems regarding the choice
of asset pool quality. In the other regressions we see little potential for endo-
geneity. These regressions address loss allocation, given exogenous originator
characteristics and attitudes of investors and rating agencies. While originator
characteristics vary across transactions and are therefore used as controls, attitudes
of investors and agencies should be similar for all transactions. Including a CBO
dummy variable as a regressor does not lead to endogeneity, because CLO and
CBO transactions represent 2 types of transactions. Including a synthetic dummy
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variable is more prone to endogeneity problems. But the findings of separate
regressions for true sale and synthetic transactions are similar.
Our assumption that Moody’s quality assessments of the asset pool are
unbiased, is difficult to test. Assessment biases might be driven by joint interests
of originators and rating agencies, as suggested by the Congressional hearings on
mortgage-backed securitizations of Oct. 22, 2008. Our findings, however, indicate
that the rating methods have been rather stable over the sampling period. We are
not aware of any major changes in rating methodologies for corporate loans/bonds
and CDO transactions after our sampling period.
The discussion about the best way to measure the DS has led us not only
to consider Moody’s DS, but also ADS based on interindustry default correla-
tions of 0%, 2%, or 4%. The regression results are similar. Sometimes the results
are somewhat stronger for 4%. This may indicate that 4% was considered more
realistic. If Moody’s over- or underestimated all WADPs by the same multi-
ple, this would not affect our findings, apart from the level of the regression
coefficients.
The assumption of a constant loss given default ignores that this parameter
changes with business conditions that might impact loss allocation. Uncertainty
in WADP and correlations should affect the results because the formulas for
the loss allocation measures indicate nonlinear effects, as illustrated in Tarashev
(2010), for the value at risk. For example, ADS is a declining convex function of
correlation so that correlation uncertainty should upward bias the expected ADS.
Given an increasing convex function of the loss share in ADS, the expected loss
share would also be upward biased. Similarly, uncertainty in WADP should
upward bias the expected loss share, since the loss share tends to be a declining
convex function in WADP. Parameter uncertainty might also upward bias the
support probability.
On a general level, our sample of 169 European CDO transactions is modest
even though it covers about 1/2 of the European transactions in the sampling period.
This clearly limits the generality of our findings. The number of those transactions
in the United States was much larger. It would be useful to compare our findings
with those from the United States. It is dangerous to apply our findings to securiti-
zations of other claims like mortgage-backed loans, credit card claims, etc. Asset
pool quality in these securitizations is measured by other criteria; often, diversifi-
cation of these pools is much stronger. This may lead to other loss allocations.
V. Conclusion
This paper investigates loss allocation to first, second, and third loss positions
in securitizations of corporate loans and bonds. The originator cooperates with
investors and rating agencies to determine the quality of the underlying asset
pool and the loss allocation. A sample of European securitization transactions
of corporate loans and bonds shows that the size of the first loss position (FLP)
is strongly and inversely related to asset pool quality, while the third loss position
(TLP) is positively related. The FLP likely serves to mitigate information asym-
metry problems, in contrast to the TLP. The general guideline for structuring
transactions appears to be that the FLP should cover a high share of the expected
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default losses, largely independent of the asset pool quality and of originator
characteristics. The support probability of the FLP (i.e., the probability that the
FLP absorbs all losses) is inversely related to the WADP of the asset pool, as
predicted by theory.
The loss share is higher in CBO than in CLO transactions. In the latter,
originators can mitigate default losses through their loan monitoring. The smaller
loss share in CLO transactions suggests that rating agencies and investors antici-
pate a strong monitoring effort of the originator in CLO transactions, due to high
reputation costs. Also, higher default rates of bonds relative to loans may motivate
a higher loss share in CBO transactions.
Asset pool quality and originator rating positively affect the originator’s
preference for a synthetic transaction with a large TLP. Its size increases with the
quality of the asset pool, in contrast to the FLP. Retaining the TLP is also in con-
flict with the claim that the originator should sell the least information-sensitive
tranche. Selling this tranche does not achieve a substantial risk transfer; moreover,
credit spreads of Aaa tranches tend to be higher than those of standard Aa-bank
bonds so that an originator with a good rating may consider funding through Aaa
tranches too expensive.
Originator characteristics have a surprisingly small impact on loss allocation
except for the choice between true sale and synthetic transactions. This indicates
that choices are largely driven by attitudes of investors and rating agencies. We
do not find evidence that rating standards declined over time.
This paper sheds some light on the regulation of securitizations. Forcing the
originator to retain 5% of all tranches would impose a loss share of the same
percentage on her. Forcing her to retain 10% of the FLP would impose a loss share
of 7%–9% on her. Hence, the latter is presumably more effective to constrain
adverse selection and moral hazard. Clearly, more empirical research is needed
to better understand the various motives driving loss allocation in securitization
transactions.
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